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INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments."' The
Supreme Court established the basic principles applying this
amendment to the death penalty during a six-year period in
the 1970's. First, in 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,2 the Court
invalidated all then-existing death penalty statutes. Second, in
1976, in Gregg v. Georgia' and its companions, the Court upheld some of the statutes promulgated in response to Furman
but invalidated others. Finally, in 1978, in Lockett v. Ohio,4
the Court invalidated an Ohio statute because it failed to give

1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The entire text of the Eighth Amendment provides: 'Excessive bail shall not be imposed, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." Id2. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that the imposition of the
death penalty would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
3. 428 U.S. 153, 168-87 (1976) (determining that imposing the death penalty
for murder did not always violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
4. 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (deciding that the Ohio statute did not allow individualized consideration of mitigating factors as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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the sentencer a sufficient opportunity to give effect to mitigating factors that might have justified a sentence less than
death.
In recent years some Justices have viewed these decisions
as establishing two somewhat conflicting principles. Furman
and Gregg are thought to stand for a "consistency-based" principle, the general goal of which is to ensure that similarly
situated defendants receive similar sentences. By contrast,
Woodson v. North Carolina--the most important companion
to Gregg--and Lockett are thought to stand for a contrary principle requiring that specified procedures be followed before
infliction of the death penalty.' This understanding of the cas-

5. 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (holding that North Carolina's mandatory death
sentence for firt-degree murder violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
6. Most secondary literature offers a similar understanding explaining the cases
as establishing a spectrum of permissible outcomes, with Furman outlawing excessive discretion, Woodson and Lockett outlawing insufficient discretion, and the Court
accepting statutes that fall in the middle. See Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox:
Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38
UCLA L REv. 1147, 1161 (1991) (stating that "Lockett' immunization of mitigating
circumstances against state regulation appears to conflict with Furman and Grres
most fundamental premise that a sentencer must not be given unbridled discretion
over whether to impose the death penalty'); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death,
1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 305, 325 (concluding that "Lockett seems inherently to subvert
any pretenses of doctrine-making'); Shelley Clarke, Note, A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas's Capital Sentencing Statute After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69
TEx. L. REV. 407, 424-25 (1990) (describing the Court!s approach as "ultimately as
simplistic as Goldilocks's approach to dealing with the three bears: complete discretion is too arbitrary ....
no discretion is just as bad ...
but guided discrtion is
just right" (footnotes omitted)); Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 139-40 (1990)
(discussing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), in which the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Arizona's death penalty statute that required a death sentence if
the judge found aggravating circumstances and the defendant failed to prove sufficient mitigation).
Probably the most careful attempt to reconcile the Woodson-Lockctt line of
cases with the Furman-Gregg line of cases is set forth in Sundby, supra, at 1174-86.
Professor Sundby notes that both cases limit the pool of persons receiving the death
penalty and thus concludes that the two cases 'are complementary cases working
towards the same end of identifying the group of defendants most deserving of death
such that its imposition is not cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 1176. The
problem with this view, though, is that it still rests on the premise that Furman
represents a condemnation of 'discretion that yielded arbitrary and capricious death
penalties. Id. As he acknowledges, this reading of Furman leaves its basic principle
in conflict with the requirement of individualized consideration set forth in Lockett.
See id. at 1177. In his view, though, the cases do not conflict because the amount of
discretion required by Lockett generally does not leave jurors room to reach decisions
sufficiently arbitrary to violate Furman. Id. at 1180-83. He acknowledges, however,
that the 'inconsistency [permitted by the existing system] ultimately may require
invalidation of the death penalty as arbitrary." Id. at 1182. I believe it is more useful to articulafe a reading of Furman, like the reading set forth in this article, that
removes the possibility of conflict entirely.
Professor Bilionis recently has argued that Lockett and its progeny are best
understood as furthering an understanding that capital punishment is "cruel" if it is
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es is unsatisfactory because the principles of Woodson and
Lockett-which effectively require the sentencing decision to be
made on a case-by-case basis-inevitably conflict with the goal
of the posited consistency-based principle: equality in sentencing.7 Reference to the text of the Eighth Amendment-which
states only that "cruel and unusual punishments" shall not be
"infiicted" 8 -does little to resolve this difficulty because it is

imposed in a case in which it has not been 'reliably determine[d] that death is indeed the morally appropriate penalty." Louis D. Biionis, Moral Appropriateness,
Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRMIINOLOGY 283,
288 (1991). He does not, however, seriously attempt to reconcile this formulation
with his understanding that the Court's decision in Furman reflected a consistencybased principle demanding rationality in the imposition of death sentences. Rather,
based on his obvious preference for rules limiting imposition of the death penalty, he
simply asserts that "[ilf Furman does threaten the principle of Woodson and Lockett,
then it is dead wrong." Id at 298; see id. at 327 (stating that "[t]ho principle advanced by Furman and its progeny requires that the potential for arbitrary or capricious results in capital sentencing must be minimized-but not at the expense of the
discretion necessary to ensure a morally appropriate sentence"). Moreover, he cannot
satisfactorily explain why a principle requiring moral appropriateness necessarily
requires discretionary sentencing by juries and emphatically precludes attempts by
state legislatures-the primary authorities regarding permissible morality under our
constitutional system-to require juries to follow certain concepts of morality. Refer
to note 122 infra (discussing Bilionis' rejection of mandatory sentencing schemes).
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, his concept of moral appropriateness necessarily rests on the premise that an "appropriate" sentence exists in each case and
that the purpose of the Constitution is to require states to do their best to ascertain
and impose that "appropriate" sentence. As the discussion throughout this article
demonstrates, the Court's decisions simply cannot be reconciled with any such concern with consistency. Refer to discussion infra part III.B. (discussing Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)).
7. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, __ 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3067-68
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing these principles as 'rationally irreconcilable," "incompatible," 'lacking in support in constitutional text," and "plainly unworthy of respect under stare decisis"); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing "the tension that has long existed between the
two central principles of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence"). Indeed, Justice
Scalia has become so dissatisfied with these two principles that he announced in
Walton that he ho longer would apply the Lockett principle. See Walton, 110 S. Ct.
at 3059, 3067 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The history of this phrase suggests that the word
"unusual" may have no independent meaning. As Justice Marshall explained in
Furman, the phrase "cruel and unusual" first appeared in the English Bill of Rights
of 1689, and the "use of the word 'unusual' in the final draft appears to be inadvertent." Furman, 408 U.S. at 318 (Marshall, J., concurring). Accordingly, the Court
generally has not endeavored to articulate a separate requirement based on the word
"unusual" but has proceeded by analyzing the word "cruel" or without considering
the specific text at all. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) (plurality
opinion of Warren, C.J.) (noting that '[o]n the few occasions this Court has had to
consider the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn").
In more recent years, though, opinions by Justice Scalia have placed an increasing amount of emphasis on the separate content of the word "unusual." Sce,
e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2691-2692 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
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not at all clear how the procedural principles established in
Woodson and Lockett further the constitutional mandate of
preventing cruelty. The difficulty is exacerbated by the Court's
well-established unwillingness to rely on historical practice in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment. 9
This article argues that these cases are not inconsistent
but can be interpreted in a way that ties them to the text of
the amendment in a meaningful way. The article starts from
the premise that justifies the Court's unwillingness to rely on
historical practice: cruelty is a socially relative concept for
which there can be no absolute definition; particular actions
can be determined to be cruel only within the context of a
particular society.' For example, although the Romans might
have seen nothing cruel in throwing Christians to the lions, we

(determining that the 'cruel and unusual" provisions provided boundaries for judges
at common law); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (per Scalia, J.)
(stating that the clause 'proscribes only those punishments that are both 'cruel and
urusuar"). The problem with this reading of the clause, though, is that it assumes
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits only punishments that are both cruel and
unusual. The text readily could bear a reading, consistent with the Courte tradition,
that bars both cruel punishments and unusual punishments. See REED DICmSoN,
THE FUNDAmNTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTiNG § 6.2, at 109-10 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing
ambiguity in the use of "and! to join modifiers that are not mutually exclusive);
Maurice B. Kirk,.Legal Drafting. The Ambiguity of 'And" and "Or,* 2 Tax. Tc L.
REv. 235, 240 (1971) (noting that -and- is particularly ambiguous when used to join
two adjectives that modify a plural noun). The logical result of the reading offered
by Justice Scalia would be that the clause would not bar commonly inflicted punishments, however cruel. Because this result is inconsistent with the Court's decisions
and seems to make the amendment completely purposeless, it is better to read the
clause as prohibiting both cruel punishments and unusual punishments, as the Court
has done implicitly.
9. Every Justice who has served on the Court during the last decade (except
Justices Souter and Thomas, who have not had an opportunity to address the point

definitively) has agreed that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a variety of punishments thought acceptable when the amendment was ratified. See, ea., Stanford, 492
U.S. at 369 (per Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices White,
O'Connor, and Kennedy) (agreeing that petitioners 'are correct in asserting that this
Court has 'not confined the prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to "barbarous" methods that were generally outlawed in the 18th centuryi but instead has
interpreted the Amendment 'in a flexible and dynamic manner') (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) Goint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.)); id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens) (stating that deciding whether a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment requires an "evolving standard of decency); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
382 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist) (pointing out that "the Eighth Amendment prohibition cannot fairly be
limited to those punishments thought excessively cruel and barbarous at the time of
the adoption of the Eighth Amendment).
10. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 382 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (The standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment.
The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic
mores of society change.').
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would." This argument entails the conclusion that as a society develops, and arguably progresses, concepts of cruelty may
develop to bar punishments once thought acceptable or recede
to accept punishments once thought cruel. 2 Thus, it can be
argued that changing conditions have made unconstitutional
methods of punishment-such as the gas chamber or the
electric chair-which decisions of the Court at one time suggested were clearly permissible."3
In determining what violates the Eighth Amendment in
contemporary American society, the Court has included several
different concepts within the meaning of the word "cruel." For
example, most would agree that the word includes barbarous
and torturous punishments. 4 The Court also has held that
the clause prohibits certain "grossly disproportionate and excessive" punishments." The thesis of this article is that the
principal line of cases involving the constitutionality of the
death penalty, from Furman through Lockett and its progeny,
reflects the view-referred to in this article as the "individual-

11.
This example is offered only for illustrative purposes. In fairness to Roman
culture, I doubt that sophisticated Romans viewed persecution of Christians 'with
approval. The earliest detailed discussion of the topic is the discussion of Nero's
persecution in the Annals of Tacitus. See TACITUS, ANNALS, Lib. XV, cap. 44 (N.P.
Miller ed., MacMillan Education Ltd. (1973)). It is difficult to read this passage
without understanding Tacitus' complete disgust with Nero. In this regard, see es.
pecially the end of the passage, in which Tacitus remarks that "pity aroos (in the
spectators] because [the Christians] were being destroyed not for the public good but
to satisfy the cruelty of one [i.e., Nero]." Id. (author's translation).
12.
"[The words of the Amendment are not precise, and ...
their scope is not
static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100.01 (1957) (plurality opinion of Warren, CJ.) (citing Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 373 (1910)); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)
("Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore
a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.").
13.
See, e.g., Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1655 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the gas chamber is cruel because of society's
experiences with the Holocaust and chemical weapons and because of the develop.
ment of other less cruel methods of execution in the 55 years since the statute was
first enacted); Lonny J. Hoffman, Note, The Madness of the Method The Use of Eletrocution and the Death Penalty, 70 TEx. L REV. 1039, 1057 (1992) (arguing that
the electric chair is cruel).
14.
See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (concluding that
"barbarous' methods of punishment outlawed in the 18th century are cruel and unusual).
15.
See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (life without parole for several
offenses involving bad checks in combination with six prior felony conviction); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (death penalty for rape). But ace Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2696-99 (1991) (limiting Solem while upholding a sontence of life without parole for a drug offense involving about 670 grams of cocaine).
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ized-consideration" principle-that infliction of the death penalty without first affording the defendant a realistic opportunity
for individualized consideration is "cruel" and thus unconstitutional. To use the Court's words, infliction of the death penalty
without individualized consideration is cruel because it treats
defendants "as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to
be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death."1 6
Applying this principle, the statutes at issue in Furman were
invalidated because they gave the sentencer so little guidance
that, as a practical matter, individualized consideration did not
occur;' the statute at issue in Gregg was upheld because it
gave sufficient guidance to foster meaningful individualized
consideration;' the statutes at issue in Woodson and Lockett
were invalidated because they precluded individualized consideration.19 To elucidate the application of this concept, this article first discusses in detail the decisions in Furman v. Georgia and in Gregg v. Georgia and its companion cases.0 It
then discusses Lockett and other cases that consolidate the
principle outlined in Furman and Gregg.2 Finally, the article
closes by discussing application of this principle to several
topics arising in Eighth Amendment cases decided during the
last few years. 2

II. INVAUDATION OF THE OLD SYSTEM:
FuRMAN V. GEORGIA
Furman v. Georgia" is a useful starting point for discussing the Court's modem application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to the death penalty. In that 1972
case the Court considered a group of state statutes quite dif-

16.

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion of

Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).

17. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(stating that the 'petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed').

18.

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-98 (1976) (concluding that diacretion

retained by a jury is controlled by objective standards).

19. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (finding that
the North Carolina statute's failure to allow particularized consideration of the defendant violated the 'fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (holding that '[t]he Ohio
death penalty statute does not permit the type of individualized consideration of
mitigating factors we now hold to be required').
20. Refer to discussion infir parts 11-III.
21. Refer to discussion infra part IV.
22. Refer to discussion infra part V.
23. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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ferent from current practices.' The typical statute of the time
delegated to the sentencer (usually a jury) complete and undirected discretion to determine whether death was the appropriate punishment for any of a great number of serious crimes.2
By present standards, the results of the system appear unacceptably arbitrary, with there being little or nothing to separate the few cases in which the death penalty was imposed
from the much larger number of cases in which it was not.
A sharply divided Court held that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause prohibited infliction of the death penalty
under these circumstances." Ten opinions explained the
Court's disposition: a brief per curiam opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court without analysis, 27 five separate opinions concurring in the judgment (none of which were joined by
any of the other Justices in the majority), and four separate
dissenting opinions. The five opinions concurring in the
judgment fall naturally into two groups: the opinions of Justicwhich concluded that the
es Brennan' and Marshall,'
and
death penalty is unconstitutional under all circumstances;
82
8
the opinions of Justices Douglas,' Stewart, ' and White,
which did not decide whether infliction of the death penalty
was unconstitutional under all circumstances. Because subsequent cases have rejected the view taken by Justices Brennan
and Marshall,' the doctrinal basis for the decision is best understood by examination of the three less definitive opinions
written by Justices Douglas, 34 Stewart, 35 and White.3
24.
Id. The opinions actually disposed of three consolidated cases, including, in
addition to Furman itself, Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas, cases in which

defendants convicted of rape had been sentenced to death. Id. at 239.
25. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that 'we deal with a system of
law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the
determination whether defendants ... should die or be imprisoned").

at 239-40.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
IdIdId.

31.

Id. at 306-10.

32.

I& at 310-14.

at 257-306.
at 314-74.
at 240-57.

33.
Although the Court's cases after urman consistently have upheld the principle that the death penalty is constitutional in some circumstances, refer to discus.

sion infra part III, Justices Brennan and Marshall consistently adhered to the view
that the death penalty is unconstitutional in all circumstances. They dissented from
each case in which the Court failed to invalidate a death sentence. See, e.g., Barrow

v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 3257, 3257 (1990) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ('Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in'all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case."

(citations omitted)).
34.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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The Douglas Opinion

The first of these less definitive opinions was tendered by
the senior Justice on the Court, Justice Douglas. His opinion is
important because it is the clearest statement of the consistency-based principle.
After a brief introduction to earlier Eighth Amendment
cases, Justice Douglas stated his view that "[ilt would seem to
be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of
his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is
imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of
such prejudices."' This interpretation of the word "unusual"--which does seem contestable to this writer--seems to
make the Eighth Amendment little more than a surrogate for
the Equal Protection Clause, prohibiting discriminatory treatment based on illegitimate classifications.' Justice Douglas
supported this novel approach by reading the historical materials-the English forerunners of the Eighth Amendment and
the legislative history of its framing-as establishing that the
Eighth Amendment was primarily directed at "selective or
irregular application of harsh penalties and that its aim was
to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe nature."o
He then proceeded to recount his viewpoint of the history
of the death penalty in this country, demonstrating with some
force that the burden of this punishment principally falls on

35. Id at 306-10.
36. Id. at 310-14; see Weisberg, supra note 6, at 315 (stating that the 'opinions
[of Justices Brennan and Marshall] are no longer important parts of tha history of
the Courtes doctrine ....
The important opinions are those of Justices Stewart,
Douglas, and White, which conditionally suspend the death penalty, and which are
the source of the Court's later efforts in doctrine-making.).
37. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242.
38. However much our society agrees that discrimination is reprehensible, the
fact remains that it is not 'unusual" in our society in any sense.

39.

Refer to note 8 supra (discussing the traditionally limited significance of the

word 'unusual' in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
40. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242. An alternate explanation for Justice Douglas' approach can be gleaned from footnote 11 of his opinion. I& at 248 n.11. This footnote
explains his perception that the Court erred when it held in MlcGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183 (1971), that the then-extant system of capital punishment was not so

arbitrary as to violate the Due Process Clause. Id. Justice Douglas, having lost his
argument on the Fourteenth Amendment point in MoGautha, may have transferred
his distaste for the arbitrary capital punishment practice of the time from that

amendment to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, offering him a basis for voting against the death penalty on the basis of a

second constitutional provision.
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"minorities or members of the lower castes."41 His analysis of
that history led to the following conclusion:
A law that stated that anyone making more than $50,000
would be exempt from the death penalty would plainly fall, as
would a law that in terms said that blacks, those who never
went beyond the fifth grade in school, those who made less
than $3,000 a year, or those who were unpopular or unstable
should be the only people executed. A law which in the overall
view reaches that result in practice has no more sanctity than
a law which in terms provides the same.
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in
their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of
equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on
"cruel and unusual" punishments.42
The fundamental problem with this consistency-based analysis
is that it treats the Eighth Amendment as nothing more than a
context-specific application of the Equal Protection Clause. This
treatment deprives defendants of the benefit of the focus on
cruelty that the Constitution commands.4 3
Finally, it is important to note the effects of his equal protection analysis on subsequent issues not raised in Furman. If
the sole issue is consistency, then a mandatory death penalty-equally applied to all-should be constitutional. 44 Accord41. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257.
42. Id. at 256-57. The notion of an "idea of equal protection . . . implicit" in the
Eighth Amendment resembles the notion of the equal protection guarantee being implicit within the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (finding that racial segregation in the District of Columbia
public schools was a denial of due process). In Boiling, of course, the analysis was
used to find a basis for applying equal protection concepts to evaluate federal action,
which otherwise would not be subject to review under these concepts. Id. In the
context of the Eighth Amendment, though, Justice Douglas' analysis has the effect of
rendering the Eighth Amendment duplicative of other provisions that already apply
to limit state action.
43. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (stating that
"[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be
without effect"). Refer to note 8 supra (discussing the need for an interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment that proscribes cruel punishments). Of course, to the extent
that Justice Douglas' analysis focuses only on the content of the word "unusual," he
logically still could be free to invalidate other punishments as "cruel," but his analysis in Furman does not seem to support such an approach. Rather, he seems to be
suggesting that the consistency-based principle reflects the substance of the entire
clause. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (noting that the "idea of equal protection of the
laws . . . is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments").

44. One still could argue that the class of persons convicted of capital crimes
inherently is biased against the poor and minorities, who are less likely to employ
capable legal counsel. See David R. Dow, Teague and Deatk The Impact of Current
Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 23, 50-61
(1991). This continuing bias might have led Justice Douglas to invalidate even a
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ingly, Justice Douglas in the last paragraph of his opinion reserved the question "[w]hether a mandatory death penalty
would otherwise be constitutional."4 5
B.

The Stewart Opinion

Justice Stewart was the second Justice to decline to address whether the death penalty was cruel and unusual in all
circumstances. His opinion is especially important because he
was the only member of the Furman majority to join in the
writing of the decisive opinions in Gregg and its companions
four years later. In addition, the ambiguous phrasing of his
Furman opinion provides the most frequently quoted source for
the concept that the Furman judgment reflected a consistencybased principle like the analysis explicitly set forth by Justice
Douglas.
Justice Stewart first noted that he did not think the cases
raised the question of whether the death penalty is always
unconstitutional but went on to offer some brief comments on
the point.' In particular, he addressed the two principal justifications for the death penalty addressed by Justice Brennan in
his Furman concurrence: deterrence and retribution. 4 7 As for
deterrence, Justice Stewart acknowledged that empirical evidence suggests that the deterrent effect is slight.' As for retribution, he expressly rejected the view of Justices Brennan and
Marshall4 9 that retribution is not a legitimate end of punishment.' In a foreshadowing of the Gregg opinion, he explained.
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channelling that instinct in the administration of criminal
justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability
of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe
that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon
criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,* then there
are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice,
and lynch law."1

facially nondiscriminatory mandatory death penalty.
45.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 257. The Court answered this question in the negative

in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). Refer to discussion infra
part I11B.
46.

See Furman, 408 U.S. at 306-10.

47.
48.

Id. at 300-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 307 n.7.

49.

See i&L at 304-05 (Brennan, J., concurring); iU. at 342-45 (Marshall, J., con-

c.rring).
50.

Id. at 308.

51.

Id.
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Finally, in the last two paragraphs of his opinion, he
turned to the constitutionality of the sentences before the
Court. He started by offering two reasons for condemning the
sentences, reasons that resonate with the tests offered by Justices Brennan and Marshall. First, he stated "it is clear that
these sentences are 'cruel' in the sense that they excessively go
beyond, not in degree but in kind, the punishments that the
state legislatures have determined to be necessary." 2 Second,
he tentatively offered a more literal basis for his conclusion,
explaining that "it is equally clear that these sentences are
'unusual' in the sense that the penalty of death is infrequently
imposed for murder, and that its imposition for rape is extraordinarily rare."' But he declined to "rest [his] conclusion upon
these two propositions alone."' Instead, his vote rested at bottom on his belief that "[t]hese death sentences are cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual ....
I simply conclude that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."55
At first glance, Justice Stewart's rationale seems to focus
on equality of results and thus offers nothing more than a
mandate for consistent and equal sentencing, much like the
consistency-based principle articulated by Justice Douglas.
But Stewart's equivocal words support an alternate reading of
this passage more consistent with future cases; a focus on the
intent of the punishers rather than the results of the process
suggests that the concern reflected is less with the imprecise
results than with the state's unwillingness to bother to look at
the circumstances of the individual defendants.57 This process
is cruel because, in Justice Brennan's words, the State treats

52.

Id. at 309. This reasoning resembles the excessiveness analysis offered by

Justices Brennan and Marshall, both of whom argued in Furman that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits punishments that are inordinately excessive. See id. at 279

(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 331-332 (Marshall, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 309. But refer to note 8 supra.
54.

Furman,408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).

55.

Id. at 309-10.

56.

See id. at 249-55 (Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining that '[a] penalty ...

should be considered 'unusually' imposed if it is administered

arbitrarily or

discriminatorily" and that "the desire for equality was reflected in the ban against
'cruel and unusual punishments' contained in the Eighth Amendment").
57.
As the Court has recognized in other contexts, the constitutional prohibition
on 'cruel and unusual punishment" suggests a focus on the intent of the punishing

entity. IcL (emphasis added); see Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324-25 (1991).
Poor or inequitable treatment alone, without regard to intent, would not violate the
Eighth Amendment. Id.
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the defendants as "objects to be toyed with and discarded."'
C. The White Opinion
.The last of the three controlling Furman opinions was Justice White's. His opinion historically has been less important
because in subsequent cases he frequently has differed from the
Court on the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause in this area.' The core of his analysis was what he
perceived to be the "near truism7 stated at the commencement
of his opinion "that the death penalty could so seldom be imposed that it would cease to be a credible deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other end of punishment in the criminal justice system."60 He concluded that the death penalty at
the time of this decision was so infrequently imposed that "it
would be very doubtful that any existing general need for retribution would be measurably satisfied"" and that "the death
penalty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency, will make little contribution to deterring... crimes."' He then concluded
that the Constitution would not permit a penalty of such severity to be imposed in these circumstances, because the infrequency with which the death penalty was inflicted made it ineffective to serve the posited purposes.' In substance, his was a
vote consistent with the tests offered by Justices Brennan and
Marshall that prohibit unnecessarily severe punishments.'

58.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 273 (Brennan, J., concurring). As the quotation aug.

gests, this reading of Justice Stewarts opinion--which views the concept of cruelty
as focused on the intent of the punisher with respect to the individual circumstances
of the defendant--bears a strong resemblance to the analytical framework articulated
by Justice Brennan in his scholarly and pathbreaking Furman opinion. That opinion
argued that the fundamental premise of the clause is the concept 'that even the
vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity." Id& at
273. Applying this principle Justice Brennan explained that torturous punishments
violate the clause not because of the pain they inflict but because we would not

inflict them on people we respected as human individuals. See id. at 272-74. Similarly, he rejected arbitrary punishments not because they were unfair but because 'the
State does not respect human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon come
people a severe punishment that it does not inflict upon others," id. at 274, and
excessive punishments because 'a severe punishment... cannot comport with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering,* id at

279.
59.

For example, he did not join any of the decisive opinions in Gregg v. Geor-

gia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and its companions. Refer to discussion infra part
any of the majority opinions discussed in Part IV.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
See id- at 311-14.

64.

Refer to note 52 supra and accompanying text.

m
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THE COURT EVALUATES THE NEW SYSTEM:
GREGG AND ITS COMPANIONS

Notwithstanding the Court's judgment in Furman that all
existing capital punishment statutes were unconstitutional,
most states tried to maintain capital punishment by passing
revised statutes that attempted to deal with the defects identified in the various opinions concurring in the Furman judgment. Accordingly, the Court heard argument in cases challenging several different types of statutes. Its decisions in these
cases, issued on July 2, 1976, mark a turning point in the development of cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence. The
Court decided five separate cases, upholding statutes from
Georgia,6 Florida,w and Texas, 7 all by seven-to-two votes,
but invalidating statutes from North Carolina' s and
Louisiana,69 both by five-to-four votes.
The failure of the Court to produce a majority opinion in
any of these cases shows the difficulty the Court had in interpreting Furman. The judgment in each case was announced
with a joint opinion written by three Justices: Justice Stewart
(who had concurred in Furman), Justice Powell (who had dissented in Furman), and Justice Stevens (who had joined the
Court since Furman was decided). These Justices were the only
Justices who agreed with the results of all the cases. 70 The
other six Justices saw no relevant distinctions among the various statutes. Justices Brennan and Marshall, following their
Furman opinions that had concluded that the death penalty is
always unconstitutional, found all of the statutes unconstitutional. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist found all of the statutes constitutional. A fair consideration of the substance of these decisions requires examination
of the plurality opinions in Gregg v. Georgia,7 ' which upheld
the Georgia statute, Woodson v. North Carolina,7 which inval-

65.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
66. Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
67. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
68.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
69.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
70.
For ease of reference, I refer to these justices as the plurality, even though
this reference is not precisely accurate with respect to the Georgia, Florida, and
Texas cases because another group of three justices (Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist) also supported those judgments for reasons different
from those set forth in the Stewart/Powell/Stevens opinions.

71.
72.

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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idated the North Carolina statute, and Jurek v. Texas,73 which
ambiguously upheld the Texas statute.74
A.

The Court Approves Guided Discretion:Gregg v. Georgia

After a statement of the facts, the plurality opinion in
Gregg falls into three parts: a summary of the statute, 75 a
consideration of whether any death penalty can be constitutional,7' and a consideration of whether the Georgia death penalty
is constitutional. 7
1. The Statute. The Georgia statute upheld in Gregg
apparently reflects an attempt to deal with the concerns about
arbitrariness expressed in the Furman opinions by making the
process more rational. By comparison to the earlier, completely
unguided process, the process considered in Gregg must have
appeared revolutionary. After a trial at which a person is convicted of a crime for which death is a permissible penalty, a
separate proceeding is held to determine what sentence is appropriate. 78 At this presentence hearing, both the prosecutor
and the defendant have relatively broad rights to present evidence that they believe
either mitigates or aggravates the ap79
propriate punishment.

73. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
74. The Florida statute upheld in Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), is
much like the statute in Gregg except that it provides a judge, rather than a jury,
as the sentencer. Id. at 249. The plurality opinion upholding this statute largely
relied on the plurality opinion in Gregg. See id. at 247-60 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Similarly, the Louisiana statute invalidated in Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), was much like the North Carolina statute found
unconstitutional in Woodson; the plurality opinion there relies heavily on the
Woodson and Gregg opinions. See id. at 331-36 (oint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.).
75.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-68.
76. Id. at 168-87.
77.
Id. at 187-207.
78.
Id. at 162-68.
79.
In relevant part the statute provides:
The judge [or jury] shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defen.
dant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas: Provided, however,
that only such evidence in aggravation as the State has made known to the
defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. The judge (or jury] shall
also hear argument by the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting
attorney ... regarding the punishment to be imposed.
Act of March 20, 1974, No. 854, § 7, 1974 Ga. Laws 352, 357 (formerly codified at
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503 (Harrison Supp. 1975)), quoted in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 16364.
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The sentencer then considers whether the evidence establishes either (1) any of ten statutory aggravating circumstances
or (2) any mitigating circumstances, whether mentioned in the
statute or not.0 If the sentencer does not find any aggravating
circumstances, it cannot impose the death penalty.81 The statute gives the sentencer the discretion not to impose the death
penalty even if aggravating circumstances are found. Presum-

80. In relevant part the statute provides:
In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the
jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony,
or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial
history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another
capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson
in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public
place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous
to the lives of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or an.
other, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary
value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because
of the exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or
committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer,
corrections employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his
official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has
escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or another.
Act of March 28, 1973, No. 74, § 3, 1973 Ga. Laws 159, 163 (formerly codified at GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Harrison Supp. 1975)), quoted in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165
n.9.
81.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Michie 1990) (current codification of Act of April
10, 1968, No. 1157, § 1, 1968 Ga. Laws 1249, 1335, amended by Act of April 25,
1969, No. 563, § 1, 1969 Ga. Laws 809, 809-10, amended by Act of March 28, 1973,
No. 74, § 7, 1973 Ga. Laws 159, 170, which was previously codified at GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-3102).
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ably this use of discretion should be based upon whatever mitigating circumstances had been found, although the statute is
not clear on this point.'
2. Can the Death Penalty Ever be Constitutional?The first
issue before the Court in Gregg was whether any death penalty
can be' constitutional. As the discussion above indicates,
FUrman left this point open, with three Justices declining to
express an opinion, two holding the death penalty unconstitutional, and four'holding it constitutional. Gregg squarely posed
this issue, and the plurality answered it by concluding that the
death penalty is constitutional.'
This section of the plurality opinion opened with the determination that history and precedent strongly suggested that the
death penalty was constitutional.' The penalty traditionally
-had been widely accepted in both America and England.' Specific provisions in the Constitution suggest the constitutionality
of the death penalty.' Finally, quite a number of the Court's
earlier cases had upheld death sentences.'
The plurality then addressed what it viewed as the two
principal arguments against the death penalty: (1) standards of
decency had evolved so far that the death penalty was unacceptable, and (2) the death penalty was so pointless that it was
useless. On the standards of decency point, the plurality declined to debate philosophical and sociological issues and instead looked to the actions of legislatures and juries as the

82.

For discussion of whether the Constitution permits the states to require that

any decisions not to impose the death penalty be based on mitigating factors, refer
to discussion infra part V.B. (discussing Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299
(1990)). The statute also provides for a special appellate procedure commonly knovm
as proportionality review, pursuant to which state appellate courts consider whether
the death sentence is proportionate to sentences inflicted in other cases. GA. CODE

ANN. 17-10-35(c)(3) (1990) (current codification of Act of March 28, 1973, No. 74, § 4,
1973 Ga. Laws 1959, 1965, which was previously codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 272537). The Court held in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-51 (1984), that the
Eighth Amendment does not require proportionality review.

83.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87 (1976).

84.
85.

I& at 168-72.
See i& at 176-77.

86.

The Fifth Amendment, ratified contemporaneously with the Eighth Amend-

ment, provides that the death penalty cannot be imposed 'unless on a presentment

or indictment of a Grand Jury.' U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the double jeopardy clause of the same amendment prohibits 'twice [being] put in jeopardy of life' for
the same offense. Id. Finally, the Due Process Clause of that amendment prozribes
depriving an individual of 'life' without "due process of law.' Id. Each of these pro-

visions implies that an individual constitutionally could be deprived of life by government action. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 380 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 419 (Powell, J., dissenting).
87. See, eg., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177-78 (discussing earlier cases).

510

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:493

primary indicators of these standards. According to this opinion,
written only four years after Furman, the legislatures of 35
states and the United States Congress had responded to
8
Furman by attempting to pass new death penalty statutes. 8
Similarly, juries in at least 254 cases between Furman and the
end of 1974 had elected to impose death sentences. 9 Based on
this evidence, the plurality concluded that society's evolving
standards did not justify condemnation of the death penalty.90
Finally, the plurality considered whether legislatures plausibly could believe that the death penalty serves any useful
purpose, focusing on what it perceived to be the two principal
purposes posited to support the death penalty: retribution and
deterrence." On the first point, the plurality did not adopt the
views presented in Furman by Justices Brennan and Marshall,' who contended that retribution was not a permissible
goal of punishment.9 3 Rather, the plurality accepted retribution as a goal and explained by quoting the rhetorical passage
from Justice Stewart's Furman opinion, which concluded that
"'channeling [the] instinct [for retribution] serves an important
purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by
law'" 4 and that retribution is not "a forbidden objective nor
88.
Id. at 179-80.
89.
See id. at 182 (citing DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1974, at 1, 26-27 (1975)).
90. See id. at 181-82. This passage is doctrinally important because it is the
first indicator of how the modern Court will evaluate these standards. The irony of
this approach should be apparent. It generally would be thought unusual for the
Court to reject a First Amendment challenge by relying on evidence that 35 other
states and the national Congress had passed statutes similar to the challenged one.
But this evidence is almost determinative under the Eighth Amendment-the amendment in the Bill of Rights that least constrains the Court to historical and textual
concerns. The reason for the anomaly, of course, is that by relying principally on
these objectively identifiable sources, the Court helps to defuse the idea that its
relatively subjective Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is reducible to the personal
views of the individual Justices. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(plurality opinion) ("Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be,
merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by
objective factors to the maximum possible extent.").
Through the intervening years, the practice of relying principally on legislatures and juries has become almost a point of dogma, to the point at which the
Court now can debate whether it is even permissible to look elsewhere. See Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377-80 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, J.J.) (refusing to examine other sources);
id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (declining to join this portion of the plurality
opinion); id. at 391-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, J.J.) (contending that other sources are relevant).
91.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-86.
92.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 304-05 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 342-45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
93.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-84.
94.
Id. at 183 (quoting Furman,408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring)). Refer
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one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men. s
The core idea in the Gregg plurality's acceptance of retribution as an acceptable purpose seems to be one of responsibility.
Society's insistence that individuals bear responsibility for their
acts-paying the ultimate penalty for ultimate crimes-is not
cruel, even if that penalty does nothing to further other goals
like deterrence.' This analysis also is consistent with the
reading of Justice Stewart's Furman opinion outlined above:
there is nothing inconsistent in requiring a State to consider an
individual's circumstances and yet permitting a State to require
the individual to take responsibility for the consequences of his
actions. Indeed, the retributive ends of the death penalty surely
are furthered more by a system that carefully considers the
merits-and the demerits-of the defendant's circumstances on
a case-by-case basis; the more carefully that information is
considered, the more likely it is that the penalty will be imposed in the cases in which society feels the greatest need to
exact it. In sum, it may be primitive, barbaric, and distasteful
to exact the death penalty, but-at least to the extent it is imposed based on society's insistence that individuals bear responsibility for their crimes and the harm they cause-it is not
cruel in the sense in which the Constitution speaks, blindly
inflicting the death penalty without bothering to consider
whether the individual defendant truly deserves it.9'
Because the plurality had found that retribution was an
adequate motive, it was able to avoid a definitive position on
the deterrence question, stating that "there is no convincing
empirical evidence either supporting or refuting th[e] view" that
the death penalty is a significantly greater deterrent than other
penalties.' Thus, the plurality concluded that these two purto text accompanying note 51 supra for the entire passage in Justice Stewars

Furman concurrence.
95. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
96. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (The heart of the retribution
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.").
97.
Professor Robin West, in the Foreword to a recent Supreme Court Issue of
the HarvardLaw Review, suggests that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence profitably

could take account of the focus on civic responsibility set forth in the vaitings of
Vaclav Havel. See Robin West, The Supreme Court-Foreword:Taking Frccdom Seri.

ously, 104 HARv. L Rhv. 43, 85-93 (1990). The notion of "responsibility" on which
she focuses, however, is quite different from the notion of responsibility proposed in
the text. As the text makes clear, I read Gregg as upholding the death penalty at
least in part on the notion that it furthers the desire to make defendants responsi-

ble for their actions. By contrast, Professor West focuses on structures that would
cause jurors to discharge a sense of civic responsibility. Id. Thus, in her view, "(tihe
juror's responsibility for his fellow citizen, and responsibility to reach the morally
right decision, is precisely what defines the juror as citizen' Id. at 91.

98.

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-86. Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to
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evaluate the philosophical merit of the results reached by the Court, a comparison of
the plurality's approach to Kant's theories of punishment is interesting. As discussed
in the text, the plurality upholds the permissibility of capital punishment solely on
the basis of retribution rather than as a means to further some other purpose of
society. The plurality's unwillingness to rely on goals (like deterrence) other than
simple retribution conforms well to the general understanding of Kant's views on
criminal punishment, which prohibited punishment designed to serve extraneous
social goals. E.g., ImemNUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, 100
(John Ladd trans., 1965) [hereinafter I. KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE]

(stating that 'fj]udicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in
all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime; for
a human being can never be ... confused with the objects of the Law of things");
I1MANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (William Hastie trans., 1887) [here.
inafter I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw] (parallel passage); see also JEFFRIE G.
MURPHY & JULES L COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 121 (rev. ed., Westview Press

(1990)) (explaining that the retributive theory of punishment does not seek to justify
punishment in terms of social utility but that the retributist seeks "the punishment
that the criminal ... deserves or merits"). But see Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant
Have a Theory of Punishment, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 512-18 (1987) (discussing
Kantian writings that conflict with this understanding of Kant's thought).
One problem with any attempt to see the plurality's opinion as expressing
Kantian views is that Justice Stewart's explanation of what he means by retribution--"promoting the stability of a society governed by law," Furman, 408 U.S. at
308 (Stewart, J., concurring)--seems to conflict with the Kantian notion that punishment should not be inflicted on an individual to further other social goals (such as
deterrence or the promotion of social stability). See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra, at
120-21 (explaining Kant's retributive theory as seeking to justify punishment with "a
theory based on justice or a respect for rights" as opposed to social utility). Although
this criticism may be leveled at Justice Stewart's ambiguous explanation, it may not
fairly be leveled at the core concept of retribution, which, as one recent text explains,
is quite different from a commitment to such unattractive things as revenge
or vindictiveness. These latter responses to wrongdoings are personal responses to perceived wrongs to oneself and motivated by a concern with
one's own self-regard or self-respect. The narrow and personal nature of this
concern is revealed in the fact that persons so motivated often seek to take
personal and extralegal steps to redress their perceived wrongs. The demand
for punishment as retribution is quite different, however, for it grows out of
respect for the law (not simply oneself), the demand that attacks against the
law (not simply against oneself) be taken seriously, and the belief that the
only morally acceptable way to deal with such attacks is in terms of a theory based on justice or respect for rights (and not utility) as a primary value.
Id. at 120-21 (footnote omitted).
In any event, it is clear that Kant's precise views on punishment do not have
immediate relevance to the debate at hand because Kant rather clearly believed that
capital punishment should be inflicted much more widely than the Constitution seems
to contemplate under current doctrine. See I. KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra, at 98 (stating that "[i]f ... he has committed a murder, he must
die ....

there is ...

no equality between the crime and the retribution unless the

criminal is judicially condemned and put to death"). For example, Kant argued that
the death penalty is required for each and every murder.
Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its
members (for example, if the people inhabiting an island decided to separate
and disperse themselves around the world), the last murderer remaining in
prison must first be executed, so that everyone will duly receive what his
actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be fixed on the
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poses were sufficiently plausible. Accordingly, it could not reject
the judgment of the Georgia legislature that the death penalty
served a significant purpose.'
3. Was the Georgia Death Penalty Constitutional?Finally,
the plurality turned to the most difficult issue: whether the
Georgia statute was constitutional. It started by summarizing
Furman as mandating "that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to in imize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.""° As the
plurality explained, the reason for affording this discretion is to
allow the sentencer to consider "'the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender. ' " 1' This summary resembles the language of Justice
Stewart's concurrence in Furman,1°' which the plurality in
Gregg seems to use as the holding of Furman.° It also
should be mentioned that this summary of Furman is just as
equivocal as Justice Stewart's opinion in Furman; it still leaves
Furman susceptible to a reading favoring a consistency-based
principle seeking uniform treatment of capital defendants, depending on whether the Court viewed the consideration of the
particular circumstances as an end in itself or simply as a
4
means to more consistent decision-making.'
people because they fail to insist on carrying out the punishment; for if they
fail to do so, they may be regarded as accomplices in this public violation of
legal justice.
Id. at 102; see I. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra, at 198 (parallel statement of this
thought). For a prominent discussion of Kant's views on punishment, see generally
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSICE 179-83 (1971) (explaining Kant's 'notion of treating men as an ends in themselves and never as only a means'); BEmRAND RUSSELL,
A ISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 710-12 (1945) (discussing Kanes belief to '[aict
as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a general natural
law"). For a recent discussion of the ambiguities in Kant's writings on punishment,
see generally Murphy, supra (suggesting that the theory of punishment which would
be predicted after examining most of Kant's writings is inconsistent with the theory
which would be predicted after examining the writings of others).
99.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186.
100. Id- at 189.
101.
Id. at 189 (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55
(1937)).
102.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ('I simply conclude that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence
of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and
freakishly imposed.)
103.
The reliance on Justice Stewart's concurrence is not surprising, inasmuch as
he is the only member of the Furman majority who joined in this opinion.
e
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189; Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
104. As the discussion below shows, later portions of the Gregg plurality opinion

514

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:493

Relying on this summary, the plurality concluded that it is
not enough for the State simply to put this information before
the sentencer because such an action "is not alone sufficient to
guarantee that the information will be properly used in the
imposition of punishment.""5 The problem here is that, because "the members of a jury will have had little, if any, previous experience in sentencing,""~ there is a risk that an unguided jury will fail to fulfill its role of providing an individualized application of contemporary values to the defendant's
situation. The result then may approach the random results
condemned in Furman.1"7 The plurality concluded that this
"problem will be alleviated if the jury is given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the
State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision.""~ As with the initial test,
this more developed analysis still can be read equivocally; it is
not clear whether the procedures are necessary to ensure consistent results or because it is cruel to allow the decision to
inflict the death penalty to be made by a sentencer that does
not realistically consider the individual's circumstances. Applying these concepts to the Georgia statute, the plurality accepted
the procedures that statute set out: "These procedures require
the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime and the
criminal before it recommends sentence ....
[Tihe jury's attention is directed to the specific circumstances of the crime ...
(and] is focused on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime.""°
The opinion closed with the plurality rejecting the
defendant's arguments that the system left so much discretion
to the jury that it still fell afoul of the principles behind
Furman." First, the defendant noted that the system left
prosecutors and juries "unfettered authority" to decline to seek
or impose the death penalty, thus permitting inconsistent re-

make it clear that it is the former reading which is correct: consideration of the
circumstances is an end in itself. Refer to notes 110-118 infra and accompanying
text.
105. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192.
106. Id.
107. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that random imposition of the death penalty cannot be supported by our Constitution).
108. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192.
109. Id. at 197.
110. See id. at 202-04 (stating that procedures requiring a jury to consider both
the circumstances of the crime and the criminal before deciding on a sentencing
recommendation are sufficient to meet the Furman standards).
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sults."' The plurality rejected this argument summarily:
Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to af-

ford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution.
Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the
death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected

group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided
by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on
the particularized
circumstances of the crime and the defen12
dant.
This explanation is somewhat disingenuous. Furman, with
its five separate concurring opinions, can only with difficulty be
characterized as holding anything other than that infliction of
the particular sentences before the Court offended the Constitution. Moreover, the particularized reliance on individualized
consideration set forth in this passage is much more developed
than anything in the opinions (or, probably, even the thoughts)
of the Justices when Furman was decided.
But the most important aspect of this passage is the ease
with which the plurality rejected Gregg's argument. If the point
of F rman (as seen through the Gregg plurality's eyes) is the
point Justice Douglas made-that the Eighth Amendment de-

mands consistency in sentencing" 3 -then Gregg's argument is
difficult to reject, for prosecutors and juries certainly have adequate room under the Georgia system to impose sentences in
an unequal manner."4 The plurality nevertheless could have
rejected the argument along these lines by suggesting that the
disparity was small enough to be accepted, but it did not take
this tack.
Instead, the Gregg plurality suggested that the disparity
was irrelevant, stating that the sole constitutional requirement
was to cause the sentencer to "focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant."" 5 This analysis

111.
112.

Id at 199-200.
Id. at 199.

113.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).

114. Indeed, subsequent history shows that, to some degree, prosecutors and juries in Georgia in fact have used that discretion to impose inequitable sentences,
although the situation seems far improved from pre.Furman days. See McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87, 312-13 (1987) (upholding the Georgia statute in the
face of evidence of the race-based exercise of prosecutorial and sentencing discretion).
115. Greg, 428 U.S. at 199. This focus on individual circumstances resonates
with the traditional focus of the liberal tradition on the primacy of the individual
and, as mentioned above, with Justice Brennan's analysis in Furman. Refer to note
58 supra. It also is consistent with the Kantian focus on the individual discussed
above. Refer to note 98 supra. As Kant argued.[O]ne man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to
the purpose of another, nor be mixed up with the subjects of Real Right.
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reveals the true basis for its holding. The Gregg statute is acceptable not because the results are more rational than those
under the Furman statute but because it provides for an individualized consideration of the defendant, the consideration our
society would accord anyone worthy of humane treatment 1
In sum, where Furman condemned statutes that left the jury
with broad discretion and few clear and objective standards," 7 Gregg upheld statutes that gave the guidance necessary to make meaningful consideration possible."' Thus, although nothing in the language of the Gregg opinion mandates
a choice in favor of this individualized-consideration principle
rather than the consistency-based principle articulated by Justice Douglas, the analysis in Gregg makes more sense under
the individualized-consideration principle than under the consistency-based principle.
B. The Court Rejects Mandatory Sentences: Woodson v. North
Carolina
The conflict between the consistency-based and individual1n0
ized-consideration principles comes to the fore in Woodson,
the most important of Gregg's companions. In contrast to Georgia-which dealt with the arbitrary exercise of discretion condemned in Furmanby providing detailed guidance for the exercise of that discretion 1P---North Carolina responded by elimi-

Against such treatment his Inborn Personality has a Right to protect him,
even although he may be condemned to lose his Civil Personality.
I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 98, at 195; see I. KANT, METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 98, at 100 (parallel statement of this thought). In
the context of capital punishment, he made a similar point: "[Tihe death of the criminal must be kept entirely free of any maltreatment that would make an abomination

of the humanity residing in the person suffering it." Id. at 102; see I. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 98, at 198 (parallel statement of this thought).
116. The fnmness with which the Court holds to this concept is shown by its
decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In that case, the Court upheld
the Georgia statute in the face of substantial evidence that, inter alia, Georgia juries
were granting mercy based on racial considerations. Id. at 286-87, 312-13. The Court
responded by quoting the passage from Gregg mentioned above, which explained that

'the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy" cannot violate the Constitution. Id. at 307 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199). A court pursuing a goal of consistency, rather than a goal of individualized consideration that entails allowing the
sentencer discretion to grant mercy, could not so readily have accepted this situation.

117. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); ic. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 293, 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
118. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-67, 196-98 (upholding GEORGIA CODE ANN §§ 261101, 26-1902, 26-1311, 26-2001, 26-2201, 26-3301, 27-2503, 27-2534.1, 26-3102, 272514, 26-3102, 27-2537 (Michie 1972 & Supp. 1975)).
119.

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).

120.

See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S 153, 162-67 (1976) (detailing and
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nating any opportunity for discretion so that any person convicted of a capital crime would be sentenced to death without
any consideration of individualized circumstances. 2 ' This statute squarely posed a conflict between the two suggested principles because a mandatory death penalty system would be one
of the most consistent possible sentencing systems, even though
it would accord the least consideration to the individual circumstances of the defendant.'
Following the framework set forth in its opinion in
Gregg,' the plurality first considered whether evolving standards of decency could tolerate infliction of the penalty under
the North Carolina statute.' When the Eighth Amendment
was ratified, the death penalty generally was mandatory for
capital crimes throughout the country.' But during the ensuing decades, in response to the increasing refusal of juries to
convict defendants under these statutes, legislatures searched
for alternate procedures that gave more discretion to the
sentencer.'26 The plurality next examined current legislative
treatment of the issue, stating that only one United States jurisdiction had passed a mandatory death penalty statute in the
discussing Georgia death penalty statutes).
121.
This approach initially derived from a North Carolina Supreme Court deci-

sion that invalidated the provision of the North Carolina death penalty statute that
gave sentencers the option to find the defendant guilty without inflicting the death
penalty. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285-86 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.). The North Carolina General Assembly promptly followed suit by codifying this process. Id.
122. It is possible to argue, because the mandatory system does not accord any
consideration to the individual circumstances of the defendant, that it is not consistent because it treats all defendants equally, even though we know that they are
not equal. See Bilionis, supra note 6 ("Capital sentencing schemes that legislatively
pro-set this moral calculus, or that subordinate moral considerations to legal form,
do not reliably measure the moral appropriateness of any particular death sentence
[because] [the range of moral considerations ... relevant to the appropriateness of
a particular death sentence is inestimably broad and impossible to articulate completely in advance.'); see also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) ('To
identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.'). Whatever the merits of
this view, it still must be the case that a mandatory system-acording capital punishment to all persons convicted of murder-is more consistent than a system--uch
as the one upheld in Gregg--which establishes no firm guidelines as to which individuals will receive the death penalty and which will not. Refer to note 114 oupra
(discussing results of that system). Thus, if the goal of the system is consistency,
the statute rejected in Woodson must be thought superior to the one rejected in
Greg.
123. Refer to discussion supra part III.A2.
124. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 294-301.
125. See id. at 289.
126. See id. at 289-93.
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138 years immediately preceding F'urman;that jurisdiction had
repealed its mandatory death penalty in 1957, fifteen years before Furman.'"' Finally, the plurality examined the actions of
jurors deciding cases under such statutes. Here, the plurality
was impressed both by the anecdotal evidence from earlier eras
indicating that juries often refused to obey mandatory death
penalty statutes and by various studies indicating that juries
deciding cases under systems which granted them discretion
chose to impose the death penalty only in a small minority of
the cases in which it was available." Based on these factors,
the plurality concluded that the North Carolina statute "departs
markedly from contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the punishment of death and thus cannot be applied
consistently with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' requirement that the State's power to punish 'be exercised within
the limits of civilized standards.'""
The plurality bolstered this conclusion by criticizing the
North Carolina statute's failure to satisfy the doctrinal requirement, announced earlier that morning in Gregg, that death
penalty statutes provide standards for individualized consideration. The plurality explained:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in
fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a
designated offense iot as uniquely individual human beings,
but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.
While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing
determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy
rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying
the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character
and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part
of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.1"
Here for the first time the Court clearly shows that it will
not interpret Frman as a mandate for equal and consistent

127.

See id at 295 n.30.

128.

Id 293-95 & n.31.

129.
130.

Id. at 304 (citations omitted).

I& at 301 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
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imposition of sentences; the mandatory death penalty is one of
the best means to achieve this goal. Instead, Frman will provide a mandate for procedures that treat even the person convicted of a capital crime as an individual entitled to his day in
court on the issue of whether he should live or die.1 31 Most

importantly, this understanding of the case leaves it perfectly
consistent with the decision in Gregg v. Georgia," announced
by the same three Justices on the same day.'1 These cases
are applications of the same individual-consideration principle
to different situations; it is neither necessary nor appropriate to
see them as establishing contradictory principles.
C. The Hard Case in Between: Jurek v. Texas
The Texas statute1" considered by the Court in Jurek v.
Texas'35 posed a difficult problem because it fell between the

Gregg statute, which gave the jury complete discretion to weigh
the evidence put before it at the sr ntencing hearing, ' 38 and
the Woodson statute, which required infliction of the death

131.
See id. at 304. Any fair summary of this opinion must point out that the
opinion still contains relics of the idea that Furman mandates consistency in sentencing. For example, just before the passage quoted in text, the plurality suggests
that another constitutional defect in the statute is its failure to cure the power of
juries to exercise their discretion in an arbitrary manner. See id. at 303. Anecdotal
evidence suggested that juries that did not believe a defendant deserved capital punishment frequently refused to convict the defendant. See id. at 302. It certainly is
intolerably arbitrary for a defendant's fate to depend on whether a jury will 'nullify"
the judge's instructions and acquit the defendant in violation of state law. But I
submit that, absent the problems discussed in text, the Court would have been unwilling, based solely on anecdotal evidence of arbitrary jury results, to invalidate the
North Carolina statute. Cf McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-98 (1937) (refusing to invalidate the Georgia statute despite substantial statistical evidence suggesting that in many cases prosecutors and juries were exercising their discretion on the
basis of racial considerations).
Similarly, just after the passage quoted in the text, the plurality suggested
that its demand for individualized consideration "rests squarely on the predicate that
the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long ....
Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. Focusing on the word
"reliability," one might see this case as resting on the need for consistent decisionmaking. On the other hand, a focus on what is to be made reliable-the determination that death is appropriate-brings this passage closer to the individualized-consideration principle discussed in the text. I view this passage as just another equivocal statement, consistent with either of the posited readings of Furman.
132. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
133.
See id. at 197.
134.
TEL PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
135. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
136. See Greng, 428 U.S. at 197.

520

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:493

penalty on all persons convicted of capital crimes. 7 The Texas statute, by contrast, completely prohibited infliction of the
death penalty except for certain relatively aggravated crimes,
generally narrower in scope than the categories of capital
crimes established by Georgia. i" If a person was convicted of
one of these crimes, a sentencing hearing was convened at
which the jury was asked three specific questions, generally (1)
whether the crime was deliberate and death of the victim reasonably was to be expected, (2) whether the defendant probably
would commit violent acts that make him a continuing threat
to society, and (3) whether the killing was unreasonable in
light of any provocation by the deceased.139 If the jury answered "yes" to all of these questions, it was required to impose
the death penalty, even if the evidence at the sentencing hearing had convinced the jury 14in
the abstract that death was not
0
an appropriate punishment.
The plurality's analysis of this statute was somewhat confusing. It noted that
a sentencing system that allowed the jury to consider only
aggravating circumstances would almost certainly fall short of
providing the individualized sentencing determination that we
today have held in [Woodson] to be required by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments ....
A jury must be allowed to
consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a
death sentence
should be imposed, but also why it should not
14 1
be imposed.

The Texas statute certainly does not provide for consideration of as much evidence on why a death sentence should not
be imposed as Georgia does. As mentioned above, the Georgia
statute permits a jury to decline to impose the death penalty
42
on the basis of any mitigating factor it may find relevant.
The Texas statute, by contrast, permits the jury to decline to

137. See North Carolina v. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 286 (1976).
138. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974). In Georgia any murder
is a potentially capital crime. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162 n.4 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). In Texas, by contrast, the only potentially capital
murders are murders of a peace officer or fireman, committed in the course of kidnapping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson, committed for remuneration, committed in an escape or attempted escape from prison, or committed on a prison employee. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.).
139. See Act of June 14, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 426, art. 3, § 1, Tex. Gen.
Laws 1122, 1125.
140. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
141. Id. at 271 (citations omitted).
142. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197.
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impose the death penalty only if it answers "no" to one of the
three defined questions.' 4 In many cases, the question of
whether the defendant can be expected to be violent in the
future then becomes dispositive.
The most obvious logical alternatives for the plurality were
either (1) to apply Woodson to invalidate the statute because of
its failure to permit consideration of relevant mitigating evidence or (2) to uphold the statute on the theory that the Texas
statute's questions represented a permissible determination by
the legislature of what types of mitigating evidence were relevant. In light of the clear limitations the statute places on the
types of mitigating evidence, a strong reading of the individualized-consideration principle applied in Gregg and Woodson
would call for invalidation of the statute. 1 "
The plurality avoided this problem and took neither course.
Instead, it looked to the few cases in which Texas courts already had interpreted the statute.14 In those cases, Texas
courts had directed that juries answering the second question
consider a wide range of mitigating factors as relevant to the
statutory questions.' Based on these cases, the plurality concluded that Texas courts would "allow a defendant to bring to
the jury's attention whatever mitigating circumstances he may
be able to show."1 47 The plurality closed its analysis by asserting confidently: "What is essential is that the jury have
before it all possible relevant information about the individual
defendant whose fate it must determine. Texas law clearly assures that all such evidence will be adduced."' 4 8

143. Refer to notes 139-40 supra and accompanying text.
144. Subsequent cases have made it clear that such a reading would not have
been out of line. Refer to discussion infra part IV.C. (discussing Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989)). Similarly, subsequent developments suggest that it would have
been questionable for the Court to hold that the limitations the text of the Texas
statute seemed to place on mitigating evidence constituted permissible determinations of relevance. Refer to note 162 infra (discussing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1 (1986)).
145. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268-74.
146. Id. at 272-73.
147. Id. at 272.
148. Id. at 276. This rather confident evaluation of Texas law was comewhat
unjustified and thus led to a major reevaluation of Jurek in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989) (discussed infra part IV.C.). It seems likely that the Court at the
time of Jurek had not yet developed the full sensitivity to the broad variety of mitigating evidence that it would show in later years. Only when cases such as Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Penry squarely placed such evidence before the
Court could it fully evaluate the significance of these limitations.
Alternatively, one might say that over the years the Court has come to emphasize the importance of the individualized-consideration principle behind Gregg and
Woodson and to de-emphasize its desire to allow states some flexibility in fashioning
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Although some question remains about the accuracy of the
plurality's evaluation of the Texas statute, 149 the analysis in
Jurek, like the analysis in Gregg and Woodson, shows that the
Court in 1976 already had advanced to an understanding of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause that focused on the
need for individualized consideration rather than on some need
for consistency in sentencing."s If consistency had been the
goal, the Court readily could have upheld the Texas statute as
being even better than the statute upheld in Gregg because it
focuses the jury's consideration more precisely, probably thus
leading to more consistent results. Instead, it is clear from the
opinion that the Texas statute, even if it is not facially unconstitutional, is not as satisfactory as the Georgia statute because
of the potential limits it places on the jury's ability to consider
relevant mitigating evidence."'
IV.

THE CouRT REFINES ITS REQUIREMENTS

The 1976 decisions in Gregg and its companions in no way
settled the question of what types of procedures the Eighth
capital sentencing procedures. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 74 (1987). This
increased or decreased emphasis may be due to its perception that the need for
experimentation has passed; the procedures upheld in Gregg may seem to the Court
to be procedures that adequately respect the states' need for practicality. Any procedures that accord less consideration to the defendant may find a skeptical reception
from a Court that is sure the state easily could adopt a practical alternative that
better attends to the defendant's individual situation.
149. Refer to note 144 supra.
150. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-76 (1976).
151.
Id. at 271-74. Although I have noted above, refer to note 98 supra, a general coincidence between the principles articulated by the Court and certain views of
Kantian philosophy, it is beyond the scope of this essay to evaluate the moral value
of the Court's decisions. For an excellent discussion of retributive justice and its
relationship to the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see Joseph L
Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40
HASTINGS LJ. 229, 247-66 (1989) (discussing the Court's 'reliance on retributive
principles . . . in three lines of cases [involving] the application of certain punish.
meats to certain classes of defendants, the use of certain kinds of aggravating factors in sentencing, and the role of discretion in capital sentencing"). My purpose
here, rather, is to establish that the principle I have outlined, or something like it,
actually drives the Court's decisions. It is my guess that its decisions respond more
to its perceptions of values inherent in the American ethos than to deep familiarity
with philosophical writings. From this perspective, it is easy to see that the individualized-consideration principle certainly resonates, not only with the Kantian and
liberalist notions discussed above, refer to notes 98 and 115 supra, but also with the
"'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,"
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (quoting 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449, at 417 (1981)). By proceeding in this
way, the Court more readily can be seen to be furthering its concepts of societal values rather than concepts that, although respected in the academy, may not be so
firmly based in our ethos as to be entitled to constitutional respect.
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Amendment required for infliction of the death penalty. Intervening years have forced the Court repeatedly to refine and
reinforce the principle articulated in 1976: that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment if it is imposed by a
sentencer deprived of the opportunity to consider the individual
circumstances of the defendant.'5 2 This part of the article discusses three of the leading cases refining this point: Lockett v.
Ohio,15 3 Sumner v. Shuman,"5 and Penry v. Lynaugh.'"
A.

Individualized Consideration:Lockett v. Ohio

The requirement of individualized consideration that began
to show itself in Gregg and its companions emerged more clearly in 1978, when the Court invalidated Ohio's death penalty
statute in Lockett v. Ohio.166 The Ohio statute in question required imposition of the death penalty upon persons convicted
of capital crimes unless the trial judge found that the victim of
the offense had induced or facilitated the offense, that the offense had been committed under duress, coercion, or strong
provocation, or that the offense was the product of some psychosis or mental deficiency of the defendant.157 The murder
for which Sandra Lockett had been convicted had been committed by another, she had been sentenced under the so-called
felony-murder rule, which allows murder convictions in some
circumstances for persons participating in a felony in the course
of which someone is murdered."s The statute did not allow
the jury to consider whether her relatively slight participation
in the murder justified a lesser sentence.
The plurality in Lockett"a responded with a firm exten-

152. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
153. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
154. 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
155. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
156. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
157. See i&. at 607 (plurality opinion of Burger, CJ.) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.04(B) (1975)).
158. See d. at 593. The Eighth Amendment limits the circumstances under
which death sentences can be imposed for convictions under the felony.murder rule.
See e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152-58 (1987) (limiting the felony-murder
rule under the Eighth Amendment to offenses in which the requisite culpability of
the defendant is found). Indeed, Justice Blackmun wrote separately in Lockett, calling for the reversal of Lockett's conviction, in part, on this basis. See 438 U.S. at
613-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159. Chief Justice Burger wrote the decisive opinion and was joined by the authors of the plurality opinions in the Gregg cases, Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589-609. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring
on narrower grounds. See iUi at 613-19. Justice Marshall filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment on the ground that the death penalty always is unconstitutional. Id.
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sion of the Woodson opinion, arguing that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death....
There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases
governmental authority should be used to impose death. But a
statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from
giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the
defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the
offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for
a less severe penalty.1e

The plurality offered only two limitations on this rule. First, it
reserved judgment on whether mandatory death sentences could.
be permitted in certain limited circumstances, such as when life
prisoners commit murders.' 6 ' Second, it stated that it was not
limiting "the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior
record, or the circumstances of his offense."' 6 2
It is important to note how this decision, which goes far
towards requiring states to follow specified procedures before
inflicting the death penalty, differs from the more common procedural due process cases that require the government to follow
certain types of procedures before taking certain actions that
infringe on individual interests. In procedural due process cases, one of the main motivating forces for the procedures is to
increase accuracy of the decisions." 6 The procedures in the

at 619-21. Refer to note 33 aupra (discussing Justice Marshall's uncompromising
views on the constitutionality of capital punishment). Justice Brennan did not participate. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 609. Justices White and Rehnquist were the only dissenters. See id. at 621-24 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgments of the Court); id. at 628-36 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
160. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05 (footnotes omitted).
161. Id. at 604 n.11. This issue was resolved in Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66
(1987) (holding that mandatory death sentences are unconstitutional in all cases).
162. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12. Nor would this exception be read broadly, as
the Court's subsequent decision in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986),
shows. In Skipper, the Court held-over spirited disagreement by Justice Powell, one
of the co-authors of the decisive opinions in the Gregg cases-that the sentencor
must be allowed to hear evidence related to the defendant's demeanor in prison
after commission of the crime, even though the state courts reasonably had concluded that the evidence was irrelevant to his moral culpability for the crime. See id. at
4-5.
163. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (including as factors
in the decision "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest to the proce-
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death penalty context, by contrast, are not designed to produce
a so-called "correct" result; indeed, it is hard to think that a
definitively "correct" answer exists for the question of whether
a particular individual should be sentenced to death. If anything, as discussed above, the requirement of these additional
procedures in capital sentencing proceedings actually undermines the consistency of the results by increasing the possibility of discretion on the part of the sentencer.G Instead, the
procedures are designed to enhance the likelihood that in
passing sentence the sentencer will consider the individual
characteristics of the defendant and the offense.
In sum, the Court in Lockett answered the question it left
unaddressed in Jurek: whether the Eighth Amendment permits
state legislatures to limit the range of moral bases upon which
sentencers may decline to impose the death penalty." The
Texas statute considered in Jurek appeared to impose such
limitations, but the plurality had argued that Texas courts
would avoid those limitations." In Lockett, the Court squarely faced, and condemned, a situation in which a state court had
ordered infliction of a death sentence without allowing the
sentencer to consider the mitigating
force of factors that many
17
in our society might find relevant. 6
B.

Mandatory Death Penalties: Sumner v. Shuman

On several occasions during the development of its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court declined to decide
whether there were any circumstances under which a state
automatically could impose a death penalty without requiring
the sentencer to consider the individual circumstances of the
defendant."6 The most common example was that of a capital
murder committed by a prisoner already serving a life sentence
without opportunity for parole."e
If the Eighth Amendment seeks rationality and consistency
in decision-making, a mandatory death penalty in such cases
should be acceptable. For such a narrow class of persons committing such serious crimes, it hardly can be thought that a

dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards').
164. Refer to notes 110-114 supra and accompanying text.
165. Refer to note 144 supra and accompanying text.
166. Refer to note 148 supra and accompanying text.
167. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
168. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 77 (1987) (discussing prior refusals to
decide this point).
169. See, e-g. id. at 77-78.
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jury frequently would decline to follow a state statute mandating death in all instances. Moreover, the group of persons who

have committed the most serious crimes would receive the most
serious penalty. Imposition of this mandatory penalty would
remove the inconsistency of one of these persons not receiving
the death penalty, even though others who have committed
crimes the legislatures view less seriously have received the
death penalty.
Conversely, if the primary goal of the Eighth Amendment
is a norm of individualized consideration, this case should be
an easy follow-up to Lockett, the principles of which require
such consideration. The Court's 6-3 rejection of such a statute
in Sumner shows the vigor with which the Court holds the
individualized-consideration idea to be the key to the meaning
of the constitutional prohibition of cruelty in capital punishment. 7 ° After summarizing the prior decisions, which had left
this point open, the Court concluded that the two elements of
the crime did not even in these limited circumstances
provide an adequate basis on which to determine whether the

death sentence is the appropriate sanction in any particular
case. The fact that a life-term inmate is convicted of murder
does not reflect whether any circumstance existed at the time
of the murder that may have lessened his responsibility for
his acts ....
The simple fact that a particular inmate is serving a
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole does
not contribute significantly to the profile of that person for
purposes of determining whether he should be sentenced to
death ....
[The two elements that are incorporated in the
mandatory statute ... also say nothing of the "[c]ircumstances
such as the youth of the offender, . . . the influence of drugs,

alcohol, or extreme emotional disturbance, and even the existence of circumstances which the offender reasonably believed
provided a moral justification for his conduct."171
The Court rejected the argument that its holding would
leave the state effectively powerless to punish these individuals. 7 ' If they already were in prison for life without parole,
and if the state could not impose the death penalty, the state

170.

I& at 70-85.

171.

Id. at 78, 80-82 (some brackets and ellipses in original) (quoting Roberts v.

Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977) (per curiam)).
172. Id. at 83.
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argued, how was it to punish such crimes?' The Court briefly, and somewhat implausibly, suggested that less severe sanctions were available: "An inmate's terms of confinement can be
limited further, such as through a transfer to a more restrictive
custody or correctional facility or deprivation of privileges of
work or socialization."' 4 This argument, though, is relatively
unpersuasive because these sanctions hardly seem adequate
punishment for a first-degree murder. A firmer basis for rejecting this argument appeared in the rhetorical conclusion to the
analytical portion of the opinion, in which the Court explained
that "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment requires that the defendant be able to
present any relevant mitigating evidence that could justify a
lesser sentence."7 5 In substance, even if the state effectively
is powerless to punish a particular crime, it cannot sentence
people to death without according them a day in court to plead
their own cases before the sentencer.
C.

Jurek Revisited: Penry v. Lynaugh

As discussed above,'7 the Supreme Court's decision to
7
uphold the Texas death penalty statute in Jurek v. Texas' 7
was considerably more ambiguous than its decisions to uphold
the Georgia statute in Gregg v. Georgia7 8 and to invalidate
the North Carolina statute in Woodson v. North Carolina."
In substance, the Court upheld the Texas statute based on its
view of the types of evidence Texas courts would consider relevant to answering the statutory questions.'6 The decision
posed a particularly difficult problem for the Court in later
years because it became clear that the statute did not permit
consideration of all of the factors deemed relevant in such cases
as Lockett and Sumner.*"' The seriousness of Texas' problem
was revealed by the Court's 1988 decision in Franklin v.
Lynaugh,8 2 in which the Court upheld a Texas death sentence by a 5-4 vote, with Justice O'Connor's decisive vote ex-

173.

Id.

174.

Id- at 84.

175. Id. at 85.
176. Refer to discussion supra part flI.C.
177. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
178. 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
179. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
180. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269-76.
181. 8ee, ag., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 (1988) (recognizing that
the rule of Lockett is broader than the Texas scheme considered in Jureh).
182. 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
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plained in a concurring opinion in which she concluded that the
Lockett problem was not squarely presented because the defendant Franklin had not shown any relevant mitigating evidence
i 3
that would have affected the result.1
The Court finally resolved this issue in Penry v.
Lynaugh.l 4 Speaking for a 5-4 majority, Justice O'Connor
sharply limited Jurek to take account of the concerns expressed
by the Court's decision in Lockett.185 Penry presented substantial evidence that he was mentally retarded and had suffered
abuse while a child."s He contended that these circumstances
diminished his responsibility for the murder he committed but
that the Texas statute-which asked the jury only a series of
specific questions-prevented the jury from giving due consideration to these factors. 7 The Court agreed, describing "Jurek
as resting fundamentally on the express assurance that the
special issues would permit the jury to fully consider all the
mitigating evidence a defendant introduced that was relevant to
the defendant's background, character, and to the circumstances
of the offense."'88
The Court then examined the evidence Penry introduced
and its relation to the special issues presented to the jury. The
first special issue asked whether the defendant acted "deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased ... would result."" 9 Although Penry's evidence may
have been relevant to this question because it cast some doubt
upon his ability to form a sufficiently firm intent to commit a
"deliberate" act, the Court concluded that Penry's evidence
"had relevance to [his] moral culpability beyond the scope of
the special verdict questio[ni." Personal culpability is not solely a function of a defendant's capacity to act "deliberately." A
rational juror at the penalty phase of the trial could have
concluded, in light of Penry's confession, that he deliberately
killed [the victim] to escape detection. Because Penry was
mentally retarded, however, and thus less able than a normal
adult to control his impulses or to evaluate the consequences
of his conduct, and because of his history of childhood abuse,
that same juror could also conclude that Penry was less morally "culpable than defendants who have no such excuse," but

183.

Id. at 184-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

184. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
185. See id. at 328 (finding the Texas scheme insufficient because of its failure to
give weight to potentially mitigating evidence as required by Lockett).
186. See id. at 307-10.
187. See id. at 310-11, 322.
188. Id at 321.
189. Id. at 322.
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who acted "deliberately" as that term is commonly understood.' 9
The second special issue asked "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society."19 '
Penry's evidence was relevant to this point "only as an aggravating factor because it suggests a 'yes' answer to the question
of future dangerousness."'
The Court found this unsatisfactory because "Penry's mental retardation and history of
abuse... may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime
even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be
dangerous in the future."'' It approved of Judge Reavley's
comments for the Fifth Circuit: "What was the jury to do if it
decided that Penry, because of retardation, arrested emotional
development and a troubled youth, should not be executed? ...
[The second question] did not allow the jury to consider a major
thrust of Penry's evidence as mitigating evidence."'9'
Thus, it is clear that the questions presented to the
sentencer at Penry's trial did not allow mitigating force to be
given to all of the mitigating evidence.'
In response to what
seems an obvious violation of Lockett, the state argued that
authorizing the jury to "render a discretionary grant of mercy... would be to return to the sort of unbridled discretion
that led to Furman v. Georgia."" The Court disagreed."
First, it repeated the explanation offered by the plurality in
Gregg v. Georgia that, even though the "'decision to impose
[the death penalty] had to be guided by standards so that the
sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant,'.., there is no constitutional infirmity in a procedure that allows a jury to recommend mercy based on the mitigating evidence introduced by a
defendant.""e It then explained, with some arguable inconsistency, that the jury must be allowed to "'decline to impose
the death sentence' [so that it can] give effect to mitigating evi-

190. 1&L at 322-23 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185 (1988) and
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (OConnor, J., concurring)) (come
brackets in original) (citations omitted).
191. Id. at 323.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
opinion

I.
Id at 324.
Id (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 925 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Indeed, the State conceded as much at oral argument. See id. at 326.
I&
Id
Id- at 326-27 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (joint
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
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dence relevant to a defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense," even though that effect necessarily
causes its judgment to depart from the standards described
above as being constitutionally required. 199
This type of explanation cannot logically be reconciled with
a reading of Furman as standing for a consistency-based principle. If Furman did establish such a mandate, then Penry seems
to create a defendant-biased jurisprudence finding consistency
important only in the process of imposing sentences (that is,
when inconsistency hurts defendants) and finding inconsistency
that aids defendants (that is, by granting mercy) to be constitutionally mandated.' ° The individualized-consideration principle described in this article explains the cases in a more satisfactory manner. Gregg and Lockett are two aspects of that one
principle: Gregg requires guidance so that the sentencer will
have some notion of how to consider the defendant's circumstances; Lockett requires that the defendant be permitted to
introduce mitigating evidence so that the jury will have the
evidence it needs to accord the defendant that consideration.
The Texas statute struck down in Penry impermissibly limited
the nature of the evidence that could enter into the decision of
the sentencer.
After this article was in page proofs, the Supreme Court
decided Graham v. Collins." In that case, the court rejected
a claim raised by a defendant under Penry, reasoning that the
claim sought a "new rule" that a federal court could not recognize on habeas corpus under Teague v. Lane.' Although the
decision technically holds only that Graham's claim sought a
new rule, the Court's discussion of Penry strongly indicates that
the Court will not interpret Penry as broadly as this article
suggests. ° In particular, Graham suggests that Penry adopted a special rule limited to cases in which the defendant presented mitigating evidence that had no relevance whatsoever to
any of the Texas questions. 2°4 Because Graham's evidence had
some relevance to the issue of dangerousness (although the
question "did not allow the jury to consider a major thrust of

199. Id. at 327-28 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987)).
200. For a vigorous statement of the difficulty of reconciling these cases when
they are read from the traditional perspective, see Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. CL.
3047, 3063-64 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
201. No. 91-7580 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1993).
202. 489 U.S. 288 (1989); see Graham, No. 91-7580 at 5-17.
203. See Graham, No. 91-7580 at 12-16.
204. See id. at 14.
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evidence'S), the Court indicated in Graham that it would be
consistent with Penry to apply the Texas statute as written,
without offering the jury an additional basis to consider the
evidence. 0 6

V. NEW FRONTIERS: THE STATES ATtEMFr To
STRUCTURE THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION
Recent years have forced the Court on several occasions to

attempt to apply the principles established above in new sorts
of cases.' 7 Now that the Court has made it clear that the
Eighth Amendment's requirement of an individualized decision
leaves little room for the states to limit the bases on which the
defendant can attempt to individualize himself to the jury, the
states increasingly are testing their ability to structure other
aspects of the decision-making process. This Part first explores
two areas in which states have encouraged the jury to act rationally, whether by discouraging reliance on sympathy and
other nonrational factors or by requiring the jury to have a
basis for a decision to grant mercy.0 This Part then considers efforts by states to balance the individualizing determination by attempting to introduce victim-impact evidence to establish the weight of the retributive interest in the death penalty
and 9to offset the evidence the defendant uses to argue for mer20
cy.
A.

Anti-Sympathy Instructions

One of the most troubling issues the Court has faced in its
recent Eighth Amendment cases deals with so-called anti-sympathy instructions. 2'0 The Court first considered such an instruction in California v. Brown.21 1 In that case, the instructions directed the jury to refrain from basing its sentencing
decision on such matters as "'mere sentiment, conjecture, sym' 22
pathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. n 1
Although defendants argue that instructions like these violate

205. Penry, 487 U.S. at 324
208. Graham, No. 91-7580 at 14.
207. Refer to discussion supra parts III and IV.
208. Refer to parts V-.A and V.B. infra.
209. Refer to part V.C. infra.
210. This type of instruction has produced three Supreme Court cases in the last
five terms: Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370
(1990); and California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
211. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
212. Id. at 540 (quoting the trial court's instructions to the jury).
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Lockett by prohibiting the jury from considering relevant mitigating evidence, 213 prosecutors contend that they further the
constitutional mandate for rational and consistent sentencing
established by Furman and Gregg.2 14 In Brown, the Court upheld the anti-sympathy instruction, taken in context with another instruction, which directed the jurors to consider "'any
matter relevant to...
mitigation... including, but not limited
to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense,...
and the defendant's character, background,
history, mental con215
dition and physical condition.'"
The Court's analysis in Brown proceeded by reaffirming
that juror consideration of mitigating evidence is a "'constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.'2 1M The Court concluded that the instructions,
taken as a whole, would not have led a reasonable juror to decline to consider this evidence.21 7 The Court then explained
that the disputed instruction permissibly directed .the jury not
to consider other evidence and thus "foster[ed] the . . . 'need for
reliability in the determination21 that death is the appropriate
'
punishment in a specific case. "'
Justice O'Connor's separate concurrence made similar
points.2 19 She saw the case as one that "squarely present[ed]
the tension that has long existed between the two central principles of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence": the consistency-based rule she saw in Gregg requiring standard-guided decision-making and the rule she saw in Lockett requiring that the
sentencer must be permitted to consider all relevant mitigating
evidence.'
As had the Court, she reaffirmed the need for
consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence because
"punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant. Thus, the sentence imposed at
the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to

213. See, eg., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492 (1990); Brown, 479 U.S. at 645.
46.
214. See, e.g., Saffle, 494 U.S. at 493; Brown, 479 U.S. at 544.
215. Id. (quoting CAL PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1987)).
216. Brown, 479 U.S. at 541 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
304 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
217. Id. at 542. As Justice Brennan argued in the bulk of his forceful dissent,
this interpretation of the instructions certainly is subject to question. See id. at 54760. For my purposes, though, the important question is the legal standard such
instructions should convey to the sentencer, not whether the state has failed to convey that standard.
218. Id. at 543 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
219. Id. at 544-46.
220. See id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the defendant's background, character, and crime rather than
mere sympathy or emotion."2 2 ' Also as had the Court, she
nevertheless accepted the instruction "[b]ecause the individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty is
a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, and not
an emotional response to the mitigating evidence.'
From
her perspective, the Gregg mandate is not offended by the use
of an anti-sympathy instruction because the instruction actually
furthers rationality and consistency; the Lockett mandate is
satisfied because the procedures permit the sentencer to consider all mitigating evidence.
Justice O'Connor's analysis of the earlier cases is unsatisfactory. Gregg did not require procedures for the sake of rationality and consistency in decision-making, but rather to focus
the attention of the sentencer on the moral issue at hanoi2 2
If the sentencer is not directed to pay attention and "listen" to
the defendant's individual story,2 infliction of the death penalty is nothing more than a cruel rejection of the human dignity of convicted defendants, pursuant to which the state discards
these defendants as worthless without taking the time to consider on an individual basis whether the blanket judgment
truly is justified. Put another way, Lockett does not establish a
principle in tension with Gregg; it offers instead a further description of the items which the Constitution requires to be
considered so that a decision is based on an adequate assessment of the defendant's individual circumstances.
California v. Brown is a difficult case to assess because it
requires delineation not just of the types of evidence to be considered, as Lockett had, but of the type of consideration the
sentencer must give to that evidence to prevent the decision
from being cruel.22 5 Justice O'Connor thoughtfully describes
the desired result as a moral response from which the state
legitimately may exclude purely emotional factors.'
The
term "emotional," though, is rather equivocal in this context.
Justice O'Connor, like the Court, seems to use the term to refer
only to random and irrelevant factors. It surely is correct that
the Constitution permits, and in fact should encourage, states
to discourage sentencers from basing their decisions on this

221. I& at 545.
222. Id.
223. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976).
224. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.10 (1982) (Loc.kett requires
the sentencer to listen [to relevant mitigating evidence].").
225. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 540.41 (1987).
226. Id. at 545.
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type of factor.'
However, as Justice Blackmun cogently pointed out in dissent, it is difficult to contend that all "emotional" responses are
irrelevant to the decision, at least if that decision is made the
way we expect sentencers in our culture to decide:
[W]e adhere so strongly to our belief that sentencers
should have the opportunity to spare a capital defendant's life
on account of compassion for the individual because, recognizing that the capital sentencing decision must be made in the
context of "contemporary values," we see in the sentencer's expression of mercy a distinctive feature of our society that we
deeply value.
In the real world, as in this case, it perhaps is unlikely
that one word in an instruction would cause a jury totally to
disregard mitigating factors that the defendant has presented
through specific testimony. When, however, a jury member is
moved to be merciful to the defendant, an instruction telling
the juror that he or she cannot be "swayed" by sympathy well
may arrest or restrain this humane response, with truly fatal
consequences for the defendant.'
Because the Court interpreted the anti-sympathy instruction
not to affect the sentencer's consideration of mitigating evidence, California v. Brown hardly can be read as a square
holding permitting jurors to disregard the emotional impact
mitigating evidence may have; but it certainly suggests that the
Court is not terribly concerned about incidental limitations on
that emotional impact.'
In its more recent decision in Saffle v. Parks,' the Court
explored this issue further. 1 The Court there explained its
conclusion, based on Brown, that it
is no doubt constitutionally permissible ... for the State to
insist that "the individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty [be] a moral inquiry into the culpa-

227.

See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion of

Stevens, J.) (noting that it is "of vital importance .

.

. that any decision to impose

the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than on caprice or
emotion").

228.

Brown, 479 U.S. at 562-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)

(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,

Stevens, JJ.)).
id. at 543.
U.S. 484 (1990).
discussion in the case is dictum because it was made in the course of
determining whether the relief sought by the plaintiff would require a "new rule"

Powell,
229.
230.
231.

and
See
494
The

within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See Saffle, 494 U.S. at
487. Because the Court concluded that relief would have required a now rule, it
declined to consider the habeas petitioner's claims on the merits. See id. at 486.
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bility of the defendant, and not an emotional response to the
mitigating evidence." Whether a juror feels sympathy for a
capital defendant is more likely to depend on that juror's own
emotions than on the actual evidence regarding the crime and
the defendant. It would be very difficult to reconcile a rule
allowing the fate of a defendant to turn on the vagaries of
particular jurors' emotional sensitivities with our longstanding
recognition that, above all, capital sentencing must be reliable,
accurate, and non-arbitrary.
This explanation, like the discussion in Brown, is somewhat
ambiguous and arguably could be read to prohibit only emotional responses based on "the vagaries of particular jurors'
emotional sensitivities"2 3 as opposed to emotional responses
based on the circumstances of the crime or the defendant. The
Court went on, however, to address this point more specifically,
describing Parks as arguing "that the Constitution requires that
the jury be allowed to consider and give effect to emotions that
are based upon mitigating evidence. " ' The Court did not expressly reject this argument, but it certainly expressed considerable hostility toward it, indicating that "we doubt that this
inference follows from Brown or is consistent with our precedents."5
After Saffle, it seems clear that the Court is unlikely to
impose significant restrictions on the ability of states to use
anti-sympathy instructions. This inaction is not entirely inappropriate because the instructions certainly do further the constitutional mandate of having sentencers focus their attention
on the individual circumstances of the crime and the defendant.
For the reasons outlined in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Brown, however, these instructions pose a significant
risk of confusing jurors regarding the nature of the evidence
they should focus their attention on, thus causing the jurors to
fail to exercise their judgment with respect to mitigating evidence that they might have found compelling.' On the other
hand, notwithstanding the comments in Saffle, the Court
should not abandon the individualized-consideration principle in
this context: at a minimum, the Court should insist that, upon

232. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 492-93 (some brackets by Saffle Court) (citation omitted)
(quoting Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
233. Id. at 493.
234. I& at 494.
235. Id.
236. 479 U.S. at 562-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recognizing the inherent conflict between a juror's desire to be merciful toward a defendant in the presence of
certain mitigating circumstances and an instruction telling the juror that her decision cannot be influenced by sympathy).
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the request of a capital defendant, a trial judge should clarify
the anti-sympathy instruction so that it does not undermine the
jurors' power and obligation to make a reasoned,2 7moral judgment about the weight of the mitigating evidence.Y
B.

Requiring a Reason for Mercy: Blystone v. Pennsylvania

In Blystone v. Pennsylvania,' the Court considered a related question when it upheld a Pennsylvania statute that requires the sentencer to impose a death sentence if it finds at
least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances.' The Court's analysis started from the precept set
forth in Penry requiring that "'the jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a
defendant's background and character or the circumstances of
the crime. ' " ' The statute in question met this requirement
because it did not limit the types of mitigating evidence that
could be considered, provided an illustrative and nonexclusive
list of potential mitigating factors, and included a catch-all
category providing for the consideration of "'[a]ny other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the
defendant and the circumstances of his offense. ' " 1 In response to these provisions the Court concluded that the statute
was not "impermissibly 'mandatory' as that term was understood in Woodson" because
[d]eath is not automatically imposed upon conviction for certain types of murder. It is imposed only after a determination
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances present in the particular crime committed by
or that there are no such mitigating
the particular 2defendant,
42
circumstances.

The principal issue in this case presents an easier variation

237.

Professor Sundby argues that the decision in Brown reflects a rejection of a

system in which jurors would be permitted to rely on "intangibles based on human
responses outside the traditional realm of logic and reason." Sundby, supra note 6,
at 1198-99. Relying on his view of Furman as a condemnation of unbridled discretion, he argues that a contrary result would make the cases "even more difficult to

reconcile." Id. at 1199. As the text indicates, this article's thesis that Furman is the
fount of the individualized-consideration principle suggests exactly the opposite: that
principle, as reiterated and expanded in Lockett, strongly suggests that the jury
should be permitted to base its verdict on its emotional reaction to the mitigating
evidence.

238.
239.
240.

494 U.S. 299 (1990).
Id at 301.
Id. at 304-05 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989)).

241.
242.

Id. at 305 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(eX8) (1988)).
Id at 305.
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of the question posed by the anti-sympathy instruction cases. In
the anti-sympathy instruction cases, the Court has permitted
states-in the pursuit of rationality-to attempt to limit the
way in which jurors consider mitigating factors to exonerate a
defendant.' " In cases like Blystone, the state also has attempted to regulate the way in which jurors reach their decisions, but only by imposing a minimal requirement that the
jurors have some basis for their decision not to impose the
death penalty. 2' Surely if the state is permitted by the antisympathy instruction cases to prohibit as irrelevant to the sentencing decision certain emotional responses, it is entitled to
prohibit decisions that are based on no articulable factor whatsoever, whether emotional or otherwise.
The principal argument raised by the dissent in Blystone is
that the statute effectively provides for a mandatory death penalty in cases in which no mitigating evidence has been offered
and the crime falls into the realm of offenses defined as capital
crimes.'
In such cases, the statute may deprive the defendant of the opportunity to convince the sentencer that the particular crime should not be one for which the death penalty is
available. 2' If so, the Court's acceptance of this situation necessarily would include the conclusion that the constitutionally
mandated individualized consideration need extend only to the
question of whether there is any reason the jury should decline
to impose the death sentence. Under this reading, the Constitution would not require the state to allow the jury independently
to determine, whether it agrees with the state's conclusion that
the crime is one for which the death penalty should be available.
But it is not at all clear that the Pennsylvania statute so
limits the sentencer's powers. The jury clearly has the authority
to decline to impose the death sentence because of "[a]ny...
evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of
the defendant and the circumstances of his offense."' Surely
a jury that believed a defendant did not deserve to die would
simply decline to impose the death sentence based on this provision.' " Accordingly, it is difficult to read Blystone as a clear
holding on this point.

243.
244.
245.
246.

Refer to part V.A. supra.
Blystone, 494 U.S. at 307-08.
Id at 313-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See d. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

247.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(eX8) (1988) (quoted in Blystone, 494 U.S. at 305).

248.

But see Blystone, 494 U.S. at 319 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting this

argument).
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C. The Scope of the Decision: From Booth v. Maryland to
Payne v. Tennessee
One other way in which states have attempted to structure
capital sentencing procedures involves the use of victim-impact
statements, which describe the effects of a murder on those
individuals close to the victim. In the 1987 case of Booth v.
Maryland, 9 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited introducing a victim impact statement into
evidence at a capital sentencing hearing, principally because
the evidence was not related to "'the character of the individual
and the circumstances of the crime' " ° and had no "bearing
on the defendant's 'personal responsibility and moral
in
Payne v.
later, however,
Four
years
guilt.""l
Tennessee,"2 the Court overruled Booth and held that the
Eighth Amendment does not bar admission of victim-impact
evidence at a capital sentencing hearing.=
These cases pose a fundamental question about the direction of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence regarding
capital sentencing hearings: what is the scope of information
relevant to the sentencer's decision? As the discussion above
makes clear, the defendant may introduce any information that
is relevant to the defendant's character or the circumstances of
the crime.' Justice Stevens argued eloquently in Payne that
this issue is the only one relevant in the capital sentencing
proceeding, finding no relevance in the character and reputation
of the victim and the effect of the crime on the victim's family
because it is "irrelevant to the defendant's 'personal responsibility and moral guilt' and therefore cannot justify a death
sentence."2
To the extent Justice Stevens is suggesting that the state
can introduce no evidence on any topic other than the
defendant's personal culpability, he is seeking to focus the inquiry more narrowly than the Court's earlier cases. Indeed, in
the joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia,' which he co-authored,
the plurality explained that the sentencer should consider not
only "'the circumstances of the offense'" but also "'the charac-

249.

482 U.S. 496 (1987).

250.
251.

Id. at 502 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)).
Id. at 502 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
Id. at 2608-11.
Refer to part IV.A. supra.
Id-at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801).
428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
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ter and propensities of the offender. "
Later that day in
Jurek v. Texas,' the Court upheld a Texas death-sentencing
scheme that focused the jurors' attention on three questions,
the second of which asked the jurors to evaluate the
defendant's future dangerousness.2 9 The problem in reconciling these statements with Justice Stevens' position is that
the defendant's propensities for future dangerousness-although
traditionally relevant in assessing criminal sentences-have
nothing to do with the defendant's culpability. Similarly, in
Skipper v. South Carolina,m the Court required South Carolina to admit evidence related to the defendant's demeanor in
prison after the crime-evidence not relevant to the defendant's
culpability."' Accordingly, it was clear even before Payne v.
Tennessee that the capital sentencing inquiry constitutionally
could-and, in some circumstances, must-considerevidence on
aspects of the defendant's character that are not relevant to the
defendant's culpability.
In Payne, the Court went further, rejecting the approach to
relevance set forth in Booth and concluding that the "'reasoned
moral response'" to be made by the capital sentencing jury fairly could rest on consideration of a broader range of evidence.2 The Court noted that "the assessment of harm
caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged has
understandably been an important concern of the criminal
law"2 and concluded that evidence of this kind is sufficiently
relevant that a state constitutionally can allow it to be considered.m A contrary rule would "depriv[e] the State of the full
moral force of its evidence and.., prevent the jury from having before it all the information necessary to determine the
proper punishment for a first-degree murder."'

257.

Id. at 189 (quoting Pennsylvania ex reL Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55

(1937)) (emphasis added).

258. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
259. Id. at 276. As discussed above, the Court largely invalidated the Texas
scheme in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), but that case turned on the Texas statute's exchsion of relevant mitigating evidence, not on its admission of evidence related to future dangerousness. Refer to part IV.C. supra. On this point

Jurek is still valid.
260. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
261. See id. at 11-14 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the evidence does not
'say anything necessarily relevant about a defendant's 'character or record,' as that
phrase was used in Lockett and Eddings').

262, Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2616 (1991) (quoting Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989)).
263. Id. at 2605.
264. Id. at 2608.
265. Id.
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The key to understanding Payne lies in the basis for the
Court's acceptance of the death penalty. As discussed above, the
plurality in Gregg determined that the death penalty is acceptable to the extent that it is being imposed to further the retributive goals of society.'
To the extent that retribution justifies a punishment based on society's desire to "pay back" the
injury it has suffered, 267 the extent of the injury is relevant
in determining the appropriate extent of the punishment. The
most logical way to allow a detailed assessment of the injury to
society-and thus to make the capital sentencing decision responsive to the level of injury inflicted by the defendant-is to
allow the jury to evaluate the harm inflicted on a personal
level, just as the Eighth Amendment requires that the jury be
allowed to evaluate the defendant's circumstances on a personal
level.' Payne reflects a determination, as a matter of constitutional law, that states are free to decide that evidence relevant to the extent of the state's retributive need for exacting
the ultimate penalty may be as relevant to the sentencing decision as evidence regarding the defendant's character and personal circumstances.2 9
Regardless of this determination, of course, victim-impact
evidence still has its problems. The opinion in Booth demonstrates with some persuasive force that evidence of this sort in
many cases will be much more prejudicial and inflammatory
27 0
than probative of any of the state's legitimate concerns.
Moreover, it certainly is unseemly for capital sentencing hearings to be reduced to mini-trials on the social value of the victim, which, even under Payne, must be thought of as having
only marginal relevance. But, in the end, it is hard to see these
concerns as relevant to the constitutional proscription on cruelty, which, at least in this context, seems to be principally directed at individualized consideration rather than consistency in

266.
Refer to discussion supra part IIl.A.2.
267.
As noted above, it is not at all clear that the Court's interpretation of the
scope of the retribution rationale is identical with more traditional philosophical
explications, but the extent of harm caused by the act seems to me to be relevant
under either formulation. Refer to note 98 supra.

268.

See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-72 (1976).

269.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609. Justice Powell made a similar argument in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), in which he argued that the state should
be permitted to exclude evidence that was not relevant to determining the state's
interest in retribution. See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 14 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell
argued that a state could exclude evidence related to post-conviction behavior because "[s]ociety's interest in retribution can hardly be lessened by the knowledge
that a brutal murderer, for self-interested reasons, has been a model of deportment
in prison while awaiting trial or sentence. * Id.
270.
See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506-08 (1987).
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decision-making. In cases in which these concerns about undue
prejudice have weight, they more properly should be considered
under the Due Process Clause, a constitutional provision more
customarily applied to ensure accuracy in decision-making and
to prevent unfair prejudice. 2 1
VI. CONCLUSION
As the history of these cases has shown, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence provides a fascinating example of the slow
and gradual development of a constitutional doctrine. Ranging
from its 1972 decision in Furman-when the Court instinctively
rejected a system for reasons on which nobody could agree-to
its 1976 decisions in the Gregg cases, when a rationale acceptable to three Justices began to emerge, to its 1978 decision in
Lockett, in which the full meaning of the earlier cases finally
was evidenced, the Court has shown a step-by-step path toward
a doctrine that-even if not consciously known to the Justices
when they wrote their opinions in Furman, and to some extent
even in the Gregg cases-provides a more plausible explanation
of those cases than most of the language in those cases themselves. Finally, the more recent cases show a Court that may
be starting to drift from these principles as it struggles to apply them without a firm recollection of the basis for the original holdings. For the Court's decisions to be made more consistent, and its opinions to be made more persuasive, it must
more directly and consciously address the principle that informed those decisions-a principle that treats as cruel any
decision which sends a defendant to death without taking the
time to consider the defendant's individual circumstances.

271. See, eg., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991) (stating that
when evidence introduced is so prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally
unfair, the Due Process Clause provides a mechanism for relief); id. at 2614-15
(Souter, J., concurring) (stating that a trial judge has the authority and responsibility to control trial proceedings in a manner consistent with due procesa, and
if he fails to do so, the defendant may object and appeal on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds).

